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FOREWORD 
Market performance has been the subject of considerable debate among 
economists, businessmen, public policy makers and various students of business 
behavior. The field of industrial organization has been the "mother lode" of 
many of the contributions to this subject, both theoretical and empirical. 
More recently, organizational theorists, managerial theorists, and a group I 
shall call technocrats have suggested alternative models of market performance. 
Many of the differences among scholars focus on the perceived motivation, be• 
havior, and influence of three interacting groups; consumers, the enterprise 
sector, and the public sector. 
This paper attempts to identify and examine some of the relevant issues 
concerning market performance. It is an outgrowth of research conducted by the 
author during 1969-70 when he was Research Associate at Marketing Science 
Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts. lb~ research was financed by a grant 
from the Marketing Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. lbe paper const~tutes one part of a forthcoming 
U.S.D.A. publication on Market Performance. 
Determinants of Market Performance 
B. w. Marion 
Adherance to a competitive economic system in the U.S. has seldom been 
seriously challenged. Beginning with the Sherman Anti-trust Act in 1890, 
the U.S. has given " ••• almost universal support for free enterprise or a com-
petitive system as an ideal". However, a "body of clear policies to achieve 
that goal has not been formulated".'!_/ 
At least in part, the lack of a "body of clear policies" is due to the 
substantial ignorance that still exists concerning a competitive system. If 
we were to ask, ''What are the essential ingredients of a competitive system?", 
a considerable array of answers would be forthcoming. The presence of com-
petitive markets would certainly be mentioned, but a similar divergence might 
be found in interpretations of what constitutes a competitive market. 
I will not be so presumptuous as to think we can resolve these issues 
in this paper. I will not even attempt to present the rationale for different 
points of view, since this has been adequately dealt with elsewhere.~/ I will, 
however, briefly counent on some of the more important conceptual issues 
concernin~ competitive markets and market performance. 
For many years, economic price theorists have attempted to develop models 
that describe the conduct and performance of groups of firms in different types 
1/ Massel, Mark S., Coug>etition and Monopoly, Doubleday & Co., Garden City, 
New York, 1964, p. 2. 
!/ F. M. Scherer presents a particularly lucid discussion. See his Industrial 
Market Structure ~nd Economic Performance, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 
1970, p. 8-38. 
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of markets. While the performance resulting from perfect competition or 
monopoly, the two extreme typea of markets, l~as been rigorously defined by 
economic models, the conduct and performance of market types in between these 
extremea--vhere nearly all real world markets fall--cannot be rigorously de-
scribed by existing theoretical models. The theory of oligopolistic markets, 
in particular, continues to represent a major problem in the theory of markets. 
Given the situation of precise and rigorous market models at the extremes, 
and imprecise and indefinite llOdels in between, interpretors of economic theory 
have tended to assume that the competitive performance of markets becomes 
progressively "leas perfect" as the characteristics of the market (its struc-
ture) departs farther and farther from perfect competition. That is, market 
performance is often !X'Pected to be related to the structure of markets similar 
to lines A or B in the following figure. 1:11 eithe,.. case, a monotonically in-































It should be clear, however, that while this functional relationship 
is frequently assumed or inferred, it has weak theoretical underpinning. 
There is no a priori basis for postulating that a reduction in market im-
perfections will necessarily result in improved (more perfect) performance. 
(E.g., an increase in the number of firms in a market from 20 to 30). Thus, 
while economic theory defines the structure of markets as being a key factor 
influencing their conduct and performance, it provides no basis for positing 
the form of the relationship. Is it linear, curvilinear, monotonic increas-
ing, discontinuous, or what? The nature of this relationship is the subject 
of considerable speculation. For example, does rivalry among several firms 
stimulate performance that is socially comparable to that cong>elled by atom-
istic markets? Just how much competition is necessary to eliminate excess 
profits? 
Empirical analysis on the degree and fonn of this relationship has con-
stituted one of the major foci of industrial or3anization economists. I 
shall conment on some of their findings shortly. 
Another major issue in the theory of.competition revolves around the 
suitability of the perfectly competitive model as a policy !!2!!!! or ideal. 
Recognizing its unrealistic nature, perfect competition remains attractive 
as a model of social and economic equity. no monopoly power is present to 
generate monopoly profits, distort the allo-::atjon of resources, and limit 
freedom. However, is cur society willine tJ sacrifice (or at least risk) 
some equity for other types of gains? If some der,ree of monopoly in a 
market is necessary to achieve scale economjes, finance research and innova-
tions, and provide a variety of products, is this worth some loss in the 
assurance of perfect equity and compelled efficiency? 
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Thia type of trade off queation is diffic11lt to answer without a more 
definitive idea of the consequences of dt~ferent levels of market imper-
fectiona and monopoly power. Scherer comments: 
"Consumers are willing to sacrifice some allocative 
nicety for variety, and 80 the social ideal must be 
not pure competition but some alloy of pure and mon-
opolistic competition. The question of market organ-
isation then becomes a quantitative one: How much 
purity to sacrifice in order to maximise social wel-
fare? And on this ouestion, economic theory has no 
operational answers." '}_! 
If the purely competitive model is not acceptable as a norm, are the 
performance criteria it suggests adequate? While the criteria it suggests 
are relevant to certain aspects of social welfare, there are also other im-
portant performance dimensions that this model does not suggest (product and 
process progresai~enesa, for example). Some of these may be more ~ortant 
in a post-industrial society than prieing and technical ef ficiency--the per-
formance factors ~hasized in the competitive models. Unfortunately, none 
of the concepts of competition provide a useful approach to ranking the im-
portance of different performance dimensions. 
The lack of greater realism in the market models of economic theory has 
also resulted in their relevance and accuracy being challenged. A frequent focus 
of "adveraar/ attack" has been the assumption that the dominant goal of f irma 
is to maxiaize profits. ':!/ Thia has been questioned on the grounds that: 
11 Scherer, F. M., Industrial Market Structure •••• , op. cit., p. 22. 
'1.f The publications on this subject are ~oo numerous to cite. For sUDllUlries 
of 80lll8 of the main issues, see F. M. Scherer. T~duatrial Market Structure 
••• , op. cit., p. 27-36; alao Fritz Machlup, ''Theories of the Firm: Mar-
ainaliat, Behavioral, Maaaaerial", in Reacl1•a in the lconwic• of lnclu-
trial Ota&nlzation, ed• D. Beedham, Holt, Rinehart &Winston, Inc., 1970. 
Firm managers normally confront numerous goals, some of which 
are not consistent with profit max!mization. Their personal 
desires for job security, prestige and power, and doing good 
works often result in some sub-optimal behavior, particularly 
with the ownership and management of firms increasingly sep-
arated. In addition, if managers confront several divergent 
firm goals (growth in sales, growth in profit, stability of 
profits, etc.) in a changing and uncertain environment, they 
may strive for satisficing results--not maximizing. 
Given the conditions of uncertainty under which many decisions 
are made, and the variance in the tirae horizons and propensity 
to risk among managers, is profit maximizing behavior either 
defineable or likely? Uncertainty about the future may result 
in sub-optimal behavior, or it may cause firms with monopoly 
power to protect their position by keepinr. costs low and prices 
at competitive levels. 
Modern firms are often large complex organizations in which 
conmunication is less than perfect, goals at different levels 
or in different departments conflict, and the information re-
ceived by management is often diffused and inaccurate. Under 
these conditions, profit maximizinG behavior is highly unlikely. 
These concerns emerge from the managerial theory of the firm, and are 
particularly relevant to market conditions w:-e e considerable monopoly power 
is present. In a competitive environment (not necessarily pure competition), 
although firm managers rriay have difficulty i" oete':"TTlining and executi..ng prof-
it maximizing b~havior, the most astutely_ope·nted (or luckiest) firms are 
likely to approach this optimum. These firns, i-;-: turn, set survival standards 
for their C01'1petitors whid' allows for little raana~ement discretion in ~·1r-
suing other goals. 
"It seems reasonable to believe that the natural se-
lection ,process is a stern master in a competitive 
environment. That it will work equally well under 
monopoly does not follow. If natural selection is 
to function in the economic sphere, its activating 
mechanism must be the competitive challenge of firms 
better adapted to their environment and opportunities. 
But when firms with market power are shielded by entry 
barriers, product differentiation, government favoritism, 
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and the like, threats to their survival may be suf-
ficiently blunted that they can.survive for decades 
without ever maximizing profits or minimizing costs. 
On this point there is little dispute. The crucial 
question is, haw sheltered from the forces of natural 
selection are firms with market power? How far can 
they depart from profit-maximizing rules and still 
remain viable?" 'J.l 
These questions largely depend upon the amount of discretion that firms 
with market power perceive themselves ~ ~· On this point, there is little 
to suggest an answer. 
Baumol contends that the primary objective of many firm managers is to 
achieve maxi11uva sales and sales growth consistent with a given level of 
profit (often close to the average for the industry). 6/ This position is 
reinforced by studies that indicate executive compensation (salaries plus 
bonuses) is more closely related to sales volwne than to profits. II 
As Baumol demonstrates, firms governed by this motivation will approach 
the frequently defined social goal of price = marg.inal costs. It might also 
be noted that in markets that are reasonably price sensitive, if only one 
entrepreneur pursues a sales maximizing objective, competing firms will be 
placed under pressure to adopt similar pricing practices. The seriousness 





Scherer, IndustriaJ. !Iarket Structure .~, op. cit., p. 35. 
Baumol, W. s., Business Behavior, Value and ~·rowth, Rev. ed., llarco•1rt, 
Brace & World, l9G7. Also, see Edith "Penrose, Tl~e Theory of 2rowth of 
the Firm, Blackwell, 1959; and J. Witliamsor1, "Profit, r.rowth and Sales 
Maximization", Eco.1omica, Feb., 1966. 
See studies cited in Scherer, Industrial :iarket Structure ••• , op. cit., 
p. 33. 
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There appears to be considerable support for Baumol's contention; maay 
firms do seek to maximize their sales or rate of growth. However, if such 
-...... 
a preposition is accepted for public policy purposes, it has the uncomfortable 
characteristic of being subject to management disgression. In highly con-
centrated markets, tacit collusion might well result in sales maximization 
being replaced by profit maximization, or in an "acceptable" profit level 
being established considerably above a "normal" level. Competitive perform-
ance would thus depend on managers adhering to such an objective, rather than 
on elements of the market structure or business environment. 
As the foundation for industrial organization analysis, economic theory 
bears one other "realism" limitation that warrants comment. That is the in-
adequacy of economic theory in dealing with multi-product, multi-market, 
and even multi-national firms in a long run time horizon. Received theory 
relates to single product firm behavior in the short run; its application to 
multi-product firms is thus limited unless multi-product firms manage the 
pricing and output of each product as if it was unrelated to all other firm 
products. For large diversified firms, this is highly unlikely due to the 
difficulty of ·allocating overhead and jo~nt costs. Also, its application is 
limited f0r firms whose behavior is essentially long run in orientation since 
theory assum~s the long run is nothing more ,than a series of consecutive 
short runs. In essence, there is no long run theory of firm behavior. Yet 
the larger the firm, the more likely that its behavior will be strongly 
influenced by long run growth considerations. 
Because of these limitations, the market determinism hypothesized by 
industrial organization theory is frequently challenged, particularly when 
considering large diversified firms. For such firms, are the external fac-
tors on which industrial organization focuses determinants of -- or even 
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important influences on--firm behavior? In a recent critique of industrial 
organization, Grether suggeata: 
''The most important issue for the field of industrial or-
ganization is how to bring the large diversified corpora· 
tion within the framework of analysis. The crux of the 
matter is whether the market structare framework can be 
employed at all; in other words, is it relevant? If such 
large corporations are free of the market, as some allege, 
it would seem futile to try to analyze their behavior and 
performance results in a market structure framework. The 
focus of research then should be on internal organization, 
policies and strategies, and their performance results. 
Orientation should then be from performance results back 
into internal organization and decision making. But if 
there is a significant amount of market determini .. and 
constraint, even if only for a period of time under given 
structural characteristics, it would seen reasonable to 
use the market structure framework of a~aJysis. ~/ 
C:rether's survey of 21 other active collea~ues in the industrial or-
ganization field indicated a strong need fo;· :'theoretical-empirical work 
in the field of oligopoly and especiaUy o~ p'·oblems of diversification 
and conglomerateness. 11 '";rether, himself, encourar,es study of the internal 
dynamics of large or3ani11:ations, particularly tlie synergetic relations amonp, 
the internal product lines, subsidiaries, etc. of large diversified corpora-
tions, and the continuin5:; interactions be~een internal firm organization 
policies &11d practices, and market struct•1res in order to provide greater 
insights into the ways market structure in fl ·~ences, or is influenced by, 
the behavior of large diversified companies. 
Workable Competition 
Given the above reservations and ~uestio~s about the adequacy and ap-
propriateness of economic theory as a mo~el for policy, it is not surprisinr 
that alternative norms have been proposed. Considerable effort has been 
E. T. Grether, "Ind11strial Organization: ~~etrospect and Prospect," 
AER, May 1970, p. 05. 
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focused on clneloping concept• of ''workable" or "effective" competition to 
fill the void in economic theory concern:tng imperfectly competitive markets, 
and to provide more relevant norms for evaluating real markets. 
Devotees of workable competition have generally placed emphasis on the 
importance of personal rivalry in imperfect markets as a motivating force 
that is comparable or superior to the compelling discipline of the illper-
8011&1 •rket in atoai.aticallI structured markets. For ex&11ple, J. M. Clark 
viewed competition as "the effort of business units, acting independently, 
to make a profitable volume of sales in the face of offers of other sellers 
of identical or similar products". ']_! And, w':ile competition normaJ ly in-
volves rivalry, Clark suggests that this may or may not be direct and 
conscious. Under conditions approaching tl.ase of pure competition, s11c'1 
as in the case of midwest corn farmers, rivalry is indirect and is experi· 
enced primarily throu8h the "market price." For oligopolistic type markets, 
however, such as breakfast cereal manufacturing, rivalry is direct and 
conscious. 
Clark and others nave also placed considerable importance on pro-
gressiveness as a critical performance dimension, and one in which the 
norms of workable competition are more appropriate than the ideal of pure 
competition. Clark observed, "The theoretical '1lodels are uniformly presented 
as operating toward an e('.!uilibrium • . • t'1e nature of this etTuil ibrium is 
the main thing studied • • • In the field of t:'eory, the most challenging 
2/ Clark, J. M., "What is Competition" in T'.1e Environment of Marketin:-; 
Behavior, 2nd ed., ed. by Robert Holloway ''= ~~obert Hancock, Wiley, 
1969, p. 195. 
opening seems to be for an approach that wo11ld s 11ift the emphasis from com-
petition as a mechanism of equilibrium to competition as a dynamic process • 
• e~uilibrium models in general afford no positive interpretation of 
the forces of progress." 10/ 
In a sillilar vein, Wroe Alderson described dynaaic competition as the 
search for a differential advantage over c~etitors; the desire to be dif-
ferent. Alderson •uggeated that this natural driving force muns that 
heterogeneity in markets is the normal and prevailing condition rather than 
homogeneity; and that conditions of dise,,uiHbrfom tend to exist except 
where the forces of competitive rivalry !1ave "temporarily stalled." 11/ 
As these comments infer, devotees of workable r:ompetition tend to 
place less emphasis on the structure of markets as the dominant influence 
on performance, contending instead t:1a~ desirable performance may be realized 
with many different market str1Jctures. r:1nn, T'at too surprising, conditions 
defined as necessary for competition to be "effertive" frerruentl y incl 1 1de 
structure, conduct and performance elements. 
Stephen Sosnick :1as effectively summarized tbe literature on workable 
12/ 
competition. In a more recent article, e proposed twenty-five undesir-




Clark, J. M. Competition as a J?xnamic Process, The Brookings Inst it 11te 
Washington, D. c., 1961, p. 43, 2, 4. 
Alderson, Wroe, N11rket Behavior and Exec.:utive Action, Richard D. Trwin, 
Inc., Homewood, Ill., 1957. 
Sosniclt, Stephen, "A Critique of Concepts of Horkable Competition", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, l'lS~. 
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to be considered "effectively" c~etitive. 13/ The first ten he defines as 
undesirable, per se; the last fifteen as undesirable only because of their 
effects. 
Undesirable, per se: 
(1) Unsatisfactory products -- needless reduction of durabi1 ity, 
suppression of new products, incomplete standardization, 
needlessly hazardous or uneven ~uality; 
(2) Underuse or overuse - - unprofitably hig:1 or 1 ow pr1c1ne, 
failure to increase and/or phase out r:apacity w'1en economi· 
cally indicated; 
(3) Inefficient exchange -- no opport'..tnity for buyers to choose 
less costly alternatives, unnecessarily large transaction 
costs, price ceilings or floors t~at create shortages or 
surpluses, failure to transmit retail price differentials 
to primary markets (or vice versa); 
(4) Inefficient production -- inefficient size, technirtues, 
locations, and organization 
(5) Bad externalities 
(6) Spoliation 
(7) Exploitation of employees by mana~:ement or of employers by 
wor.kers or labor unions; 
(B) Unfair tactics -- fraud, malicious interference; 
(9) Wasteful advertising -- false~ nisleading, or v~lueless 
(10) Irrationality -- self-defeatin::': .":oices by buyers or sellers 
Undesirable bec.:use of their effects: 
(1) Undue profits or losses -- persistent positive profits for 
sellers of inferior goods, hi~h ~osts, and over-capacity --
persistent losses for sellers of s11perfor rrua1. ity, efficient 
costs, and inadequate capacity; 
(2) Inadequate research; 
13/ Sosnick, Stephen, "Toward a Concrete Conc:ept of Effective Competition", 
Amer. Journ. of Agr. Economics, November, 1968. 
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(3) Predation -- malevolent price-cutting -- not merely unloadin~ 
excess inventoty or ~ fide attempts to meet 
competition; ·.· 
(4) Pre-emption -- of patents, raw materials, outlets, or con-
tracts with the intent and effect of hindering existing or 
potential competitors; 
(5) Tying arrangements; 
(6) Resale price maintenance; 
(7) Refusals to deal; 
(8) Undesirable discrimination -- similarities or differences in 
terms of sale to different pntrons, not justified by cost 
differences, changing conditions, o~· meeting competition, and 
which imperil small pAtrons and disadvantage some areas; 
(9) Miaallocation of risk -- inader-nate warranties, cost-plus 
procurement, unnecessary consignment; 
(10) Undesirable collaboration -- refosals to cooperate that reduce 
efficiency, and cooperative agreements that reduce initiative; 
(11) Undesirable mergers -- vertical or horizontal combination that 
do not reduce costs, and which create opportunities to inJure 
competitors through foreclosure or s~ueezing, or which reduce 
the number of competitors to fewer th.an three; 
(12) Undesirable entry-· entry by a noninnovator when undue losses 
exist, or when capacity or the ::iumber of sellers is larger than 
efficiency permits. 
(13) Misinfonnation; 
(14) Inefficient trading rules; 
(15) Misregulation -- government action or inaction that fosters 
inefficiency. 
While Sosnick' s list is much more specific t:1an the conditions set forth by 
many writers on workable competition, it still suffers from considerable 
ambiguity in interpretation. Terms such as "unsatisfactory", "inefficient", 
"unfair", and "undue'' rnust be interpreted by someone before the conditions 
-13-
can be operationalized. Also, how is a ma-rket to he evaluated if some b:1t 
not all conditions are satisfied? These are problems frenuently encountered 
in trying to apply concepts of workable competltion. 
The approach proposed by Jesse Markham over 20 years ago provides a~ 
interesting contrast in that it is unspecific and focuses attention on 
irnprovements that are possible through public policy measures. 
"An industry may be judged to be workably competitive 
when, after the structural characteristics of its 
market and the dynamic !orces tl1at shaped them have 
been thorouGhly examined, there is no clearly indi-
cated change that can be effected through public 
policy measures that would result in greater social 
gains than social losses." 14/ 
The greater realism of the norms estabU.s"1ed hy workable competition are 
attractive, particularly when trying to eval·uite markets involving differen-
tinted oligopolies. One of the more disturbin-:; aspects of workable competi-
tion efforts (aside from the operational diffir.ulties) is the lack of defi;1i-
tive cause - effect relationships. From a public policy standpoint, there 
aru strong arguments for, and efficiencies in, dealing with causal factors 
so as to perpetuate effective comp£tition, rather than to correct ineffec-
tive CC>m(.-catition. The present state of workable coq>etition concepts are 
not particu~arly facilitative of such a policy approach. 
The foregoing describes the nature and some of the deficiencies of the 
theoretical underpinning of industrial organization. This underpinning does 
provide a modest guidar.ce system both for t:1e policy maker and for the student 
of market performance. However, rather substantial wilderness areas are also 
present i.D our theoret.ical •P· It is time now to conaider the results of em-
pirical work that confim, challenge, or modify these theoretical constructs. 
14 / Markham, Jesse, "An Alternative Approach to t11e Concept of WorkabJ e 
Competition", Amer. Econ. Review, .June, 1950. 
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Empirical Studies of the Organization and Performance of Industries 
Industrial organization economists have examined many industries in the 
U.S., utilizing the models and tools of ~~onomic price theory. Many of these 
efforts have examined the hypothesis of market determinism; that is that 
the structure of an industry determines (or strongly influences) the conduct 
of the sellers comprising it, and that the conduct of sellers determines (or 
strongly influences) their collective and individual performance. 
The results of empirical analysis have led to the definition of some 
variables and relationships not specified in price theory, as industrial 
organization economists have struggled to develop models that adequately 
explain the actual performance of industries. For example, the primary in-
dependent variables suggested by price theory are the degree of seller and 
buyer concentration, the level of product differentiation, and the condi-
tions of entry. Variqus industrial organization economists have suggested 
additional variables that are important aspects of the environment or struc-
ture of an industry. These include: 
The price elasticity of demand 
The growth rate of market demand 
The ratio of fixed to total costs in the short run for 
the typical firm 
The degree of vertical integration 
The amount of diversification and conglomerateness 
The level of international trade barriers 
The influence of ~he latter group of variables has received much less 
investigation than has seller concentration, product differentiation and 
entry barriers. Because of this, we shall largely limit our comments to 
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the empirical studies of the most popular structural variables. It is im-
portant to note, however, that these are not the only exogenous forces 
that have been recognized as having a bearing on market performance. 
Problems of Eog>irical Analysis -- Industrial organization economists encounter 
several rather serious empirical problems that should be noted. Several of 
the structure, conduct or performance variables cannot be measured directly. 
Thus, in many cases, a measurable dimension is used as a surrogate for the 
characteristic of primary concern (e.g. advertising expenses as an indicator 
of product differentiation; R & D expenditures as an indicator of progressive-
·ness, etc.). This complicates analysis further, since yet another causal re-
lationship must be examined. For example, does advertising cause or result 
from differentiated products? 
Stern makes the following rather pessimistic comnent: 
'"rhe problems of obtaining objective measurements 
of the elements of market structure are legion and should 
not.be understated. In fact, some of tqe problems are so 
critical that there is real doubt as to whether any theory 
grounded on these elements can ever be verified." 15/ 
Among the measurement problems noted by Stern are: 
1. Difficulties in defining industries or markets in a manner 
that is consistent with theoretical models or competitive 
rea.lity. 16/ 
2. Questionable use of four firm concentration ratios which 
ignore differences in the dispersion of market shares. 
15/ Stern, Louis, "Market Structure as a Measure of Market Performance", 
Marketing Science Institute Working Paper, Cambridge, Mass., February, 1970. 
16/ Smith and Dahl comment on this· point, indicating that industry 
structure is often related to market conduct or performance. Since industries, 
as defined, are frequently not synonomous with one side of a market, such 
comparisons ''may be completely meaningless. 11 See "Market Structure Research--
How and For What?", Journal of Farm Econ., Hay 1965, p. 465-67. 
-16-
3. Lack of acceptable measures of product differentiation or 
barriers to entry, in spite of some innovative work by Bain 
and others. 
4. Difficulties in developing acceptable measures of several 
dimensions of performance (progressiveness, income distri-
bution, and technical efficiency, for e.xample). 
Stern also identifies analytical procedures as a frequent deficiency in 
empirical studies. Too often, single performance characteristics have been 
related to single market structure variables ~~ith linearity and continuity 
often assumed), when more fruitful results might be gained by examining the 
relationship between combinations of structure and performance dimensions, 
and in examining the interrelationships between performance variables, such 
as profits and progressiveness. Kaysen and Turner argue for a multi-variate 
approach, and for caution in the use of individual performance criteria: 
" ••• a standard of profit performance should depend not only on 
the result of efficiency, which by itself requires that the long-
run profit in excess of the supply price of capital and entrepre-
neurship be zero, but also on the result of progressiveness, which 
conceivably might call for higher prof its in any industry deemed 
capable of innovating. In practice, though, our knowledge does 
not permit us to discuss what the profit standard should in fact 
be, if progressiveness as well as efficiency are taken into con-
sideration. • •• we lack the basis in either theory or experience 
for making any generalized statements about profit standards which 
reflect the relation of prof its to all the desirable results we 
seek to achieve." 17/ 
Empirical Results -- Considering the empirical problems in market structure an-
alysis, the results of past studies warrant careful examination. Stern found 
that past efforts to verify the influence of market structure variables on 
market performance ''have been frequently inconclusive, conflicting, or extremely 
tenuous." 18/ In Sl.lllllilJrizing his analysis of the empirical efforts to relate 
17/ Kaysen, Carl, and Turner, Donald F., Anti-trust Policy, An Economic 
and Legal Analysis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 11-12. 
18/ Stem, Louis, ''Market Structure ••• ,".QI?.• cit., p. 53. A much 
fuller treatment of empirical results is in this working paper which is avail-
able from Marketing Science Institute. 
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the three market structure variables to the six performance criteria identi-
fied by Bain (1. allocative efficiency, 2. technical efficiency, 3. selling 
costs, 4. product performance and technological progress, 5. income distri-
bution, 6. full employment), he states: 
"Given the present body of knowledge on the subject, it 
appears that the strongest links, from an !. priori perspective, 
involve the structural elements of seller concentration and 
barriers to entry and the performance criteria of allocative 
and technical efficiency. Other links are either nebulous, 
contradictory, or non-existent. Kaysen and Turner's insight, 
in this respect, provides a fitting concluding statement with 
regard to the relationship between market structure analysis 
and the performance goals of (1) efficiency in the use of 
resources; (2) progress; (3) stability in output and employ-
ment; and (4) an equitable distribution of income: 
'Not all of this quartet of virtues are connected 
to the functioning of markets in an equally inti-
mate way. Efficiency is most closely dependent on 
the operation of markets. While the existence and 
character of market competition is one of the forces 
influencing the pace of innovation, it is only one; 
and other, including the supply and training of tech-
nical personnel, the expenditures by government on 
industrial research, the attitude of consumers toward 
new products and of managements and workers toward 
new methods of production, are in the aggregate of 
greater importance. To the extent that an equitable 
distribution of income implies the passing along of 
the fruits of efficiency and progress to cons\Dllers, 
it is related to the functioning of markets. To the 
important extent the ideas of equity involve judg-
~-ients that some income receivers should receive more 
and some less than they could get from the market--
no matter how cot11>etitive--equity ~st be sought by 
policies ••• other than those which affect the op-
eration of markets. Finally, fluctuations in output 
and employment are primarily responses to fluctuations 
in aggregate demand rather than to events in particu-
lar markets, and again, policies designed to promote 
stability fin~ their primary means outside the sphere 
of market organization.' 19/ 
19/ Kaysen & Turner, .!m.=.. £.!.t:., pp. 11-12. 
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Although I<aysen and Turner are advocates of the structural 
approach to analyzing our performance in allocating resources, 
they point out that income distribution, employment stability, 
and progressiveness in productivity bhght to be evaluated by 
approaches other than market structure analysis." 20/ 
These summary statements would likely meet with considerable general agree-
ment although some would contend that they are overly pessimistic. A few addi-
tional coanents on selected relationships seems in order. 
The relationship between market structure and allocative efficiency (as 
reflected by profit rates) is strongly supported by empirical studies--but not 
as a monotonically increasing relationship. Several studies have found little 
relationship between seller concentration and/or entry barriers, and profit 
rates until a certain threshhold of monopoly power is achieved. 
For example, Bain, the FTC, and Mann suggest that industries where the 
largest eight firms control 70 percent or more of the industry output are 
likely to have significantly higher profit rates than industries with lower 
levels of concentration. 21/ Mueller indicates that ·~rofits approximate 
the competitive norm (i.e., they about equal the cost of capital plus a risk 
premium) when four-firm control is less than 40 percent of the market." 22/ 
Limited evidence suggests a similar threshhold effect for entry barriers. 
Mann found no significant difference in the prof it rates of highly concentrated 
industries with "substantial" entry barriers' compared to profits in highly 
20/ Stern, Louis, ''Market Structure ••• , 11 Op. Cit., pp. 54-55. 
21/ Hearing Befor~ Subcolllllittee of the Select Coumittee on Small Business, 
United'°States Senate, Seminar on: "Are Planning and Regulation Replacing Compe-
tition in the New Industrial State?", U.S. Govt. Printing Office, June 29, 1967. 
'l:l,/ Mueller, Willard F. , A Primer on Monopoly and Cog>etition, Random 
House, New York, 1970, p. 106. 
concentrated industries with ''moderate to low 11 barriers. Highly concentrated 
industries with 'very high 11 entry barrier_~! however, experienced average 
profit rates from 1950 to 1960 that were nearly 50% higher than the other two 
groups with lower barriers. 23/ 
The relationship and direction of causality between product differentia-
tion and allocation efficiency is more difficult to unravel. Comanor and 
Wilson conducted a multi variate analysis of 41 consumer goods industry 
groups. 24/ They found that industries with high advertising outlays realized 
profits approximately 50% higher than those with modest advertising expendi-
tures. This study and others suggest that abnormal profits likely result 
from high advertising expenditures that create or are accompanied by high 
entry barriers. These results again suggest a threshhold type of relation-
ship between market structure elements and allocative efficiency. 
The interpretation of product dif~erentiation influences is not that 
clear-cut, however. In the first place, advertising expenditures carry 
strong limitations as a proxy for product differentiation. As Caves indi-
cates: 
"Sellers without product differentiation have little 
to gain from advertising, .•. By contrast, where 
product differentiation exists, each rival must ad-
vertise to keep some buyers in a frame of mind to 
prefer his product to others. In industries where 
producers can easily maintain this differentiation 
by the design of the product itself--its styling 
or special features--less of the pressure falls on 
advertising and sales promotion. But in industries 
like soap and cigarettes, where only minor physical 
differences s~arate one producer's brand from his 
rivals', advertising plays the heavy role in creat-
ing these differences in the eye of the public. 
23/ Mann, H. Michael, "Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and 
Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960 11 , Review of Economics and 
Statistics, August, 1966. 
24/ Comanor, William S. and Wilson, Thomas A., "Advertising, Market 
Structure and Performance", Review of Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1967. 
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Thus we reach a slightly paraodxical conclusion: Prod-
uct differentiation as a trait of market structure is 
responsible for heavy advertising expenditures. Among 
industries with high seller~~oncentration, however, rela-
tively slight physical differentiation of the product may 
lead to more advertising than if the physical product is 
abundantly differentiated." 25/ 
Furthermore, high advertising expenditures are frequently associated with 
new product introduction, particularly for consumer goods. Markham and Slater 
present evidence from food manufacturing industries (the ready-to-eat cereal 
industry in particular) that high advertising expenditures, increasing market 
shares, and higher profits are often associated with high rates of successful 
new product introduction. 26/ Polli and Cook lend support to this position 
in their October, 1969, article, "Validity of the Product Life Cycle" in the 
Journal of Business. 
Thus, in those industries with high levels of new product introduction, 
advertising expenditures may reflect oesirable product progressiveness, but 
abnormally high profit levels. Whether, in fact, such profit levels are neces-
sary for the development and introduction of more new products is difficult 
to ascertain. 
In those industries where high advertising expenditures do not reflect 
new produ~t introduction efforts, but rather intense efiorts to differentiate 
physically similar products, a less persuasive case can be made for their 
contribution to improved performance. 
The etrength of the linkage betweef1 'llarket structure elements and tech-
nical efficiency is open to considerable debate. Bain concludes from his 
25/ Caves, Richard, American Industry: Structure, Conduct and Performance, 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964, p. 107. 
26/ Markham, Jesse W. & Slater, Charles C., "Standards of Competition 
and the Food Industries", Proceedings of The 1966 World Congress, American 
Marketing Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1966. 
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analysis of this relationship that the main impact of market structure is 
probably on dimensions of market performance other than technical efficien-
cy. 27/ Mueller supports this position when he states: 
"Recent studies on this subject are almost unanimous in 
concluding that productive efficiency dictates high concentra-
tion in only a small and declining share of manufacturing in-
dustries." 28/ 
Empirical studies of technical efficiency have concentrated on produc-
tion economies, virtually ignoring important economies that may exist in 
marketing, finance, and planning. Mueller suggests that the requirements 
of product differentiation (especially the costs of large scale promotion) 
and distribution explain the increasing concentration that is evident in 
consumer goods manufacturing, whereas producer goods manufacturing (where 
production economies are more of a factor) have generally declined in con-
centration. While there have been no studies, to the author's knowledge, 
of scale economies in marketing, information on advertising rates and the 
cost of new product development and introduction 29/ suggests that scale 
economies are likely present in many consumer goods industries. 30/ 
Thus, it appears that if all technical efficiencies were considP.red 
(marketing as well as production), a positive relationship with seller con-
centration and entry barriers would be expected among consumer goods 
27/ Bain, Joe, Industrial Organization, Second Edition, John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 437. 
28/ Testimony at Hearing Before Subcommittee of Select Committee ••• , 
Qp_. ill·' p. 18. 
29/ See for example, Buzzell, Robert & Nourse, Robert, Product Innova-
tion in Food Processin~: 1954-19641 Division of Research1 Grad, ScbppJ pf 
Bus. Admin., Harvard univ., Boston, i\fass., 1967. 
30/ For discussion of this point, see Louis Stern, "Perspective on 
PubliC""Policy: Comnents on the 'Great Debate' ", Jou-nal of Marketing, 
January, 196~. 
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industries. In producer goods industries, however, the available evidence 
suggests that high concentration is generally not necessary to achieve 
technical efficiency. The extraordinary size of many u.s. markets makes it 
possible. for many firms to be large in absolute size, (and hence realize 
scale economies) but ·relatively small in their share of industry sales. 
The logic of the relationship between technical efficiency and market 
structure elements is persuasive. However, given the magnitude of many U.S. 
markets, such a relationship may occur largely in consumer goods industries, 
in markets that are relatively small in total output but have definite scale 
economies, and in larger markets with low levels of concentration and entry 
barriers. 
For two other performance dimensions, progressiveness and the stability 
of prices and employment, some rather tentative relationships with market 
structure elements should be noted (in addition to those receiving comment 
earlier). Although the measures of progressiveness leave much to be desired, 
the available evidence suggests that whatever economies of scale exist in 
research and innovative activity, this is achieved in most industries at 
low or moderate levels of concentracion. - This relationship is difficult 
to unrave:i. since "high concentration and rich technological opportunity 
tend to coin~ide." 31/ However, Scherer, Caves and others conclude that 
neither very low nor very high concentration is conducive to progressive-
ness; that a mixture of monopoly and competition appears to be called for 
with entry barriers at modest levels. Thus, progressiveness and structural 
elements appear to bear a relationship similar to the following: 
31/ Scherer, F. M., "Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists 
and Engineers", in Readings in the Economies of Industrial Organization, ed. 
Needham, .2£.• ill·, p. 244. 
.. 
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These hypothesized relationships are admittedly based upon limited evi-
dence. As Kaysen and Turner suggest, there may be other factors that have 
a stronger impact on progressiveness than the structure of the industry. At 
the same time, given the available empirical results, it would also be mis-
leading to suggest that no relationship is discernable. 
The linkage between market structure and employment and/or prices is 
even more difficult to ascertain with meager and often inconsistent empirical 
results. Of the various hypotheses advanced, the relationship between market 
structure and inflation is the most persuasive. 
Mueller contends that sellers with considerable discretionary pricing 
power may .::ause a "cost-push" inflation by granting unwarranted wage increases 
(which are p~ssed on in higher prices), or by increasing product prices when 
demand is declining. This response, which is contrary to that in a "competi-
tive" market, makes it difficult to control inflation, and to achieve full 
employment without infl~tion via traditional monetary and fiscal policies 
which act to expand or contract demand forces. 32/ Recent history in the 
U.S. lends credence to this position. Efforts to control inflation by manipu-
lating aggregate demand have met with limited success, particularly since 
32/ Mueller, W. F., A Primer on Monopoly ••• , 2P.• cit., p. 107-126. 
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President Nixon eliminated wage-price guidelines and the use of government 
persuasion upon taking office in 1969. F~r example, whereas the prices of 
metal and metal pr. Jucts rose an average of 1.4 percent per year during the 
1960-68 period, they increased 12 percent between January, 1969 and January, 
1971 -- a period when aggregate demand was contracting due to fiscal and 
monetary policies. This has been attributed to the "post-Johnson price orgy" 
enjoyed by the steel industry when guideline restraints were removed. 33/ 
The evidence of the relationship between market structure elements and 
inflation and/or employment is both thin and somewhat mixed. Recent experi-
ences, suggesting the detrimental effect of finns with strong discretionary 
pricing power, need further empirical examination. The information available 
at this time, however, seems to support at least a modest relationship. 
Implications of Empirical Results 
A review of the many empirical studies and the conclusions of various 
scholars can prove both confusing and amusing. Empirical results do not 
present a clear consistent picture of the determinants ~£ market performance. 
This inconsistency can be interpreted in different ways, depending largely 
on the biases and beliefs of the interpretor. On the one hand, market 
structuralist may attribute the lack of greater consistency to empirical 
deficiencies; i.e., to inappropriate proxy variables, inaccurate measurements, 
inadequate analytical procedures, etc. Studies that confirm the structure-
conduct-performance relationships expected, may be grasped as indications of 
the true relationships that would be consistently found if empirical prob-
lems could be solved. 
33/ Mueller, W. F., "Controls or Competition", Mimeo of Statement before 
the sE;".te Subcommittee on Anti-trust and Monopoly, U.S. Senate, Jan. 18, 1972. 
-25-
On the other hand, those who have strong doubts about the dominant role 
of market structure elements may interpret;· such inconsistency as evidence 
that other factors are often more important influencers of performance. That 
is, the various study results are seen as reasonably accurate and therefore 
demonstrate that the economist's models of competition are inadequate. 
For the student of industrial organization, the task of sorting through 
"facts" and "biased interpretations" to arrive at an independent, "objective" 
conclusion is extremely difficult. While we have tried to present an objec-
tive assessment of the various empirical studies, we suspect that our biases 
are also evident at various points. With this as a cautionary note, we will 
proceed. 
The foregoing capsule of empirical results indicates that market struc-
ture elements have a significant influence on certain performance dimensions, 
although the nature of this relationship is still not as clearly defined as 
one would hope for. In most cases, a continuous linear relationship is not 
apparent. Rather, certain threshhold levels of structural elements appear 
to be needed before their influence on performance is apparent. Because of 
this and because other factors (including- other aspects of the environment 
and structure of markets) may often influence performance as much or more 
than traditional market structure elements, measures of market structure are 
likely to be ra~her inaccurate proxy measures of performance. 
Given this limitation, however, the empirical results of market structure-
performance relationships still provide definite and valuable guidance to policy-
makers. Taken in total, the results suggest that the social benefits gained 
from allowing industries to become highly concentrated and/or to erect sub-
stantial entry barriers are likely to be meager or negative in most cases. 
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Technical efficiency and product or process progressiveness warrant high 
concentration in few industries, and allocative efficiency tends to de-
cline with high levels of concentration. The effect of the pricing be-
havior of concentrated industries on inflation and employment--while still 
somewhat clouded--appears if anything to be negative. Thus, the benefits 
to be gained from allowing moderately concentrated industries to become more 
concentrated are rather dubious. (Marketing scale economies in some consumer 
goods industries may be an exception, although the nature and magnitude of 
the "benefits" in such cases have yet to be determined.) 
Moderate levels of concentration, on the other hand, appear to cause 
little injury to performance, and to prove beneficial to the progressiveness 
and technical efficiency of some markets. Thus, in some instances, an argu-
ment can be made for allowing an industry with low concentration, entry 
barriers, etc., to become more "imperfect". These conclusions suggest that 
the model of pure competition should be abandoned as a viable norm for per-
formance; from the standpoint of realism and the evidence regarding social 
benefits, models of effective competition (subjective and primitive though 
they may be) appear more appropriate. In view of the above conclusions, those 
models of effective competition that specify the avoidance of high levels of 
seller concentration and entry barriers are, likely to be more consistent 
with social weifare than models which allow high concentration and/or entry 
barriers as long as performance is acceptable. 
The Need for Concepts of Growth and System Dynamics 
Many writers havt emphasized the need for concepts of competition that 
recognize growth and dynamic change as important market forces. 
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In extremely dynamic times with rapid changes occurring in the environment 
of business firms, this seems to be a particular relevant issue. For this 
reason, let us consider some of the concepts tnat have been proposed and 
empirical results that may have bearing. 
One of the earliest proponents of the strong influence of innovative 
change was Joseph Schumpeter. In his now familiar quote, he coJ1111ented: 
" ••• it is not (price, quality, or promotional) competition 
which counts but the competition from the new commodity, 
the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type 
of organization--competition which commands a decisive cost 
or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of 
the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their 
foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition 
is ••• so much more important that it becomes a matter of com-
parative indifference whether competition in the ordinary 
sense functions more or less promptly; the powerful lever 
that in the long run expands output and brings down prices 
is in any case made of other stuff." 34/ 
Malcolm McNair sounds a similar theme in proposing "the wheel of retail-
ing." 35/ In both cases, the emphasis is on periodic reorganization and 
reorientation that substantially alters the characteristics of a market system. 
Neil Chamberlain suggests that firms (and market systems we would add) 
must achieve a balance between two ever present forces--a tendency toward 
systematic, efficient, smooth running organizations (a tendency toward equilib-
rium), and a tendency toward reorganization and reorientation in response to 
changes in thei1 environment (a tendency toward disequilibrium). 36/ 
34/ Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd Cdition, 
Harper & Row, 1950, pp. 84-85. 
35/ See McNair, Applebaum and Salmon, Cases in Food Distribution, Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1964, pp. 18-19. 
36/ Chamberlain, Neil, Enterprise and Environment, McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 1968, pp. 9-10. 
-Z8-
The coaaents of Schumpeter, McNair and others would suggest that with rapid 
technological and environmental changes, the balance of these two forces 
should favor the latter--even though some sacrifices may be made in short run 
efficiency. With rapid changes in the enviromnent, firms and market systems 
that have developed "early warning radars" in the form of sound intelligence 
systems, and are quick to respond when adjustments are needed, are likely to 
benefit society to a greater extent and remain viable themselves, than those 
that are less alert but may be somewhat more efficient in the short run. 37/ 
More needs to be understood about the influence of new products, new 
technology, and the rate of growth on firm behavior in the long run. Sch1.D11peter 
placed great faith in these forces as essential characteristics of capitalism. 
He describes his notion of "creative destruction" as follows: 
''rhe fundamental impulse that sets. and keeps the capitalist 
engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the 
new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, 
the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enter-
prise creates •••• (this) process of industrial mutation •••• in-
cessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, 
37/ The worka of Lawrence and Lorsalr suggest that firms in rapidly 
changing environments may vary significantly in their organizational 
structures from those in more mature and static enviromnents. These authors 
found that firms in rapidly changing environments that were responsive to 
changes in that enviromnent had rather flat organizational structures with 
considerable f-eedom and authority at lower levels, and with considerable 
dependence placed on those in direct contact with different markets or 
clientele for information concerning changes in the environment. That is, 
those on the firing line were used more heavily as sources of intelligence 
and strategy information. This also suggests that different types of informa-
tion may be relied upon than in firms in slower changing environments. Whether 
there is any relations1lip between the organizational structure of firms or the 
flow of information, and the structure of the industry is not known at this 
point. See Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch,.Developing Organizations: Diagnosis 
and Action, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Reading, Mass., 1969; also Organi-
zation and Environmenc by same authors, Div. of Research, Harvard Business 
School, 1967. 
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incessantly creating a new one. This process of creative 
destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. 11 38/ 
While Schumpeter's CODl!lents may not apply to a particular industry at 
a particular point in time, they do speak of a fundamental and pervasive 
force that seems to characterize the U. s. economy when viewed from a de-
tached perspective. Of particular importance are the implications of the 
process of creative destruction for established positions of monopoly 
power. Economists have given insufficient attention to the temporal dimen-
sions of monopoly power. In earlier periods with less rapid change, positions 
of monopoly power tended to prevail for considerable periods. With an accel-
erated rate of "creative destruction", one might expect existing power posi-
tions to be less securely entrenched and more transient in nature. But, is 
this the case? 
From their extensive analysis of. the mobility and size structure of 
leading industrial companies, Collins and Preston concluded: 
" •.• There is considerable reason to believe that 
firms now at the top of the industrial pyramid 
are more likely to remain than their predecessors. 
The evidence of mobility does accord with a general 
assumption that large-scale corporations enjoy an 
increasing amount of entrenchment of position by 
virtue of their size." 39/ 
Profesqor Galbraith's thesis in The New Industrial State also suggests 
that power is .oore securely entrenched--not less--since modern technology 
requires large firms and concentrated markets. Robert Averitt presents 
a similar argument to Galbraith's with certain important differences. In 
his book, The Dual Economy, Averitt proposes the over-simplified yet useful 
38/ Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, •••• ,~· cit., p. 83. 
39/ Collins, Norman R. & Preston, Lee E., "The Size Structure of the 
Largest Industrial Firms", American Economic Review, Dec., 1961, p. 1001. 
idea of two quite different economies in the U.S. His description of these 
two economies is as follows: 
"Contemporary American capitalism, then, is a composite of 
two distinct business systems. The new economy is composed 
of firms large in size and influence. Its organizations are 
corporate and bureaucratic; its production processes are 
vertically integrated through ownership and control of critical 
raw material suppliers and product distributors; its activities 
are diversified into many industries, regions, and nations. 
Financial support is readily available from both internal and 
external sources. Firms in the large economy serve national 
and international markets, using technologically progressive 
systems of production and distribution. The affairs of such 
enterprises are conducted with a view to survival in perpetuity 
as they meet economic crises with successive strategies of 
firm expansion. We shall call this network of firms the "center." 
The other economy is populated by relatively small firms. 
These enterprises are the ones usually dominated by a single 
individual or family. The firm's sales are realized in restricted 
markets. Profits and retained earnings are cotmn0nly below those 
in the center; long-term borrowing is difficult. Economic crises 
often result in bankruptcy or severe financial retrenchment. 
Techniques of production and marketing are rarely as up to date 
as those in the center. These firms are often, though not always, 
technological followers, sometimes trailing at some distance behind 
the industry leaders. Let us designate the firms in the small econ-
omy by the term ''periphery." 
••• Firms in the center economy act upon the assumption that they 
have eternal life, if not assured prosperity. Like periphery firms, 
they pay close attention to costs, but their future rests primarily 
on expanding sales. Here the first rule of survival in any but the 
worst times is not cut expenses, but expand sales • 
••• By following various combinations of four basic growth strate-
gies giant firms soon realized a rate-of growth exceeding that of 
the market. These strategies were expansion of volume in traditional 
markets, geographical dispersion, vertical integration, and product 
diversification. 40/ 
••• Center :irms must diversify to escape' the inevitable decay that 
Marshall predicted. But diversify in what direction? What can be 
used as a reasonable guide to product acquisition? The answer is 
found in the force that plays the dominant role in-creating economic 
turbulence. As center firms have discovered, the root of secular 
disturbance in economic patterns is technological change~'41/ 
40/ Al&ed D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the 
Histoq of the Industri.al Enterprise, MIT Press, 1962. 
41 / Averitt, Robert T. , The Dual Economy, W. W. Norton & Company, 
lnc.,---New York, 1968, pp. 6-9, 15, 16. 
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In several respects, the pictures presented by Galbraith and Averitt 
of large diversified firms are similar. However, on certain fundamental 
aspects, they differ significantly. Galbraith contends that modern techno-
logical imperatives make concentrated markets with vast industrial enterprises 
inevitable; that large size is necessary for planning inventions, innovations 
and production processes, and concentrated markets arc necessary to allow 
management of consumer wants, thereby guaranteeing markets. 
Averitt, however, posits the relationship of large firms and technology 
in quite a different light, with much less technological determinism. His 
reasoning suggests that large firms are likely to be affiliated with industries 
where new technology is important because new technology represents growth and 
survival. Averitt thus positions his center firms as sensitive chasers of 
new technology in a system where market forces still operate to threaten posi-
tions of complacency. He says: 
••• An enterprise that ties itself to the rhythm of a particular 
industry must ultimately :ide to profit deterioration on the industry's 
life cycle. Should any firm, large or small; be so foolish as to 
associate itself solely with a particular mix of products, it un-
doubtedly must watch its profit margins dwindle near the end of the 
industry's r£Jid expansion phase when visible and sustained success 
attracts new capacity • 
••• Industrial economies do not hold a fixed form for long. A 
changing technology provides a slow ut continuous metamorphosis in 
economic strt.cture. Today's key industries may slide down the in-
dua-crial hierarchy idtO relative oblivion . 
••• The challenge of survival greatly motivates those firms close 
to the sci.entific vortex. As the rate of tec~mological change in-
creases, the secular decline of all markets is speeded up. New 
products age quickly and •·his fact prods the center firm to sharpen 
its product development aud marketinA processes • 
••• Where t(chnology leads, the center must follow, thus pr~serving 
itself frum the twentieth century's most potent firm killer." 42/ 
The divergence in these positions is. important to understand, for they 
present markedly different interpretations of the operation of market forces 
and of the possibility and desireability of controlling market structures. 
42/ Averitt, Robert, The Dual Economy, op. cit., pp. 11, 16, 75. 
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Unfortunately, neither Galbraith nor Averitt substantiate their arguments 
with empirical observations. The limited amount of evidence that bears on 
this subject lends more support to Averitt1s position than to Galbraith's. 
We have already discussed the evidence concerning progressiveness; little 
indication was found that highly concentrated markets are required or nec-
essarily desireable. (The development and/or successful introduction of some 
new consumer products may be an important exception.) 
However, past studies may tell us little about major innovations that 
restructure or reorganize an industry since they represent a small minority 
of all innovations. Numerous case examples suggest that major established 
firms are seldom the initiators of innovations that shake an industry to its 
roots. Supermarkets were introduced by small food store operators--fighting 
for a way to survive against chain organizations. Discount department stores 
were the progeny of general merchandise mavericks, not established department 
stores. Research efforts on the steam and Wankle engines, as alternatives to 
the internal combustion engine, have occurred larg~ly within firms outside the 
automobile industry. 
Large firms that are firmly entrenched in an industry may have little 
incentive to promote an innovation that will make existing facilities and 
technolog/ obsolete, and will shake up the competitive balance. Thus, it is 
not too suri:TiRing that "in many industries new entrants have been a prime 
source of invention", especially if such inventions are of "industry shaking" 
magnitude. 
The rather sparse evidence indicates no unique advantage for extremely 
large organizations in innovations of either large or small magnitude, with 
the possible exception of some new consumer products. Further, where flexi-
bility, alertness and willingness to change are particularly important, such 
size probably carries definite disadvantages. 
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At the same time, studies have also shown that: 
Concen rated industries tend to be characterized by richer 
technological opportunities, 43/ -. · 
Large firms are parcicularly active in concentrated indus-
tries, 44/ 
Large firms represent the large majority of all research 
and development expenditures, 45/ (much of this on new 
product development), 
Aggregate concentration (the percentage of all manufactur-
ing sales or assets represented by the largest 100, 200 or 
500 firms) has been increasing while market concentration 
in total has been relatively stable during the last two 
decades. This occurred as large coq>anies entered more 
industries, usually by merger. 46/ 
Consumer goods industries with highly differentiated 
products increased substantially in concentration, 
whereas those with undifferentiated products held about 
steady. 47/ 
There are undoubtedly several interpretations of the above points. One 
that seems plausible is that large organizations have gradually expanded thei 
technological capabilities (both management and scientific) in response to th 
broader technological requirements of many new products, and the threat of 
potential competitors with advanced technological capabilities. 48/ This has 
43/ Scherer, F. M. ''Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists 
and Engine::?rs", in Needham, ~· cit., p. 244. 
44/ A scudy of 135 manufacturing industries showed that the 200 largest 
manufacturers in the U.S. did 87't of the business in those industries where 
- four-firm concentration ratios exceeded 75 percent, but only 141 of the busi-
ness in industries where the top four firms represented less than 251. of the 
market. See Mueller, A Primer on Monopoly,~· cit., p. 38. 
45/ Scherer, F. M., Industrial Market Structure •••• ,~·~., p. 358. 
46/ Mueller, A Primer On Monopoly •••• , ~· ill_., chapter 3 
4 7 / !J?Je., p • 33. 
48/ This reasoning is drawn in part from Weston, J. Fred, "Changing 
Enviromaents and New Concepts of Firms and Markets", in the transcript of 
the Ninth Conference on Antitrust Issues in Today's Economy, New Technologies 
Coug>etition and Antitrust, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., N. Y., 
March 5, 1970. 
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made them both more "eligible" and more interested in entering a broad variety 
of industries--with perceived technologi~~~ opportunities--to utilize their 
capabilities investment. Because of their financial, human and technological 
resources, large organizations have been able to enter "new lands of oppor-
tunity" with much greater ease than small organizations. 
As these firms have applied their technological capabilities in product 
development, marketing, systems engineering or what have you, the industries 
which they have entered have evolved in some cases toward greater concentra-
tion with several large dominant organizations. This would be especially 
likely if the growth rate of the industry was relatively slow, and/or it 
produced differentiat ble consumer goods. At the same time, there have also 
been strong forc3s operating to erode market power and to offset tendencies 
t~ard greater concentration. More rapid technological and produce obsolescence 
are two such forces that have continually threatened established positions in 
any given industry, and have motivated large organizations to continually 
seek out other opportunities to use their technical capabilities and to dis-
perse risk. 
Rapidly growing industries have naturally been very popular as new oppor-
tunities. At the same time, it is apparent that large firms have not confined 
their entry interests to such industries. Significant growth opportunities 
for an individual firm may be perceived even in declining industries. In 
fact, one executive acquaintance of the author's contends that it is easier to 
grow in a declining thBn a growing industry. 
Information for the period 1947 to 1966 suggests that the relative attrac-
tiveness of fast growing industries probably results in a good many new entrants--
which in turn tends to deconcentrate these industries. During this period, both 
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for producer and consumer goods industries, rapid growth was associated with 
deconcentration or a slower increase in co~~entration than was true in indus-
tries with slower growth rates. 49/ Barriers to new entry are also probably 
more difficult to build and maintain in industries experiencing rapid growth. 
This interpretation tends to be more supportive of Averitt's thesis than 
of Galbraith's. It casts large organizations in the activist role of continu-
ally searching to fortify their differential advantage, to employ their capa-
bilities, and to be where the action (and the profit) is. Thus, while forces 
are continually at work to erode existing sources of monopoly power, many firms 
at the top of the industrial pyramid have devel~ped a different source of 
power; the capability to continually locate and develop new sources of monopoly 
power. 
Concluding Comments 
It should be apparent that there are many unresolved issues concerning 
market performance. As Richard Caves has suggested: 
''What we know about the determinants of market performance 
represent a few islands of knowledge protruding from a sea 
of ignorance." 5 0/ 
Fortunately, there are a few "islands of knowledge". Empirical analysis 
has provided a fairly solid link between the structure of markets and certain 
aspects of market performance. However, these relationships do not appear to be 
linear and may not be monotonically increasing as often assumed. Rather, a 
!!JJ From 1947 to 1966, industries whose sales grew less than 25% had 
an average increase in concentration of 2.91.. At the other extreme, indus-
tries whose sales increased by over 3007. experienced a decline in concentra-
tion of 3.3% on the average. Mueller, Primer on Monopoly ••• , .2P.• .£!!.., p. 64. 
2!lf Caves, Richard, American Industry ••• , .2P.• £!!,., p. 110. 
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threshhold of structural forces appears to be needed before performance is 
affected. 
Much remains to be done, particularly in examining the influence on market 
performance of vertical market relationships, of dynamic forces such as the search 
for growth and major innovations, and of large multi-industry, multi-national 
firms. The sources, uses, permanence and influence of market power also needs 
greater understanding. 
In many respects, progress in understanding the dynamics of market perform-
ance has been frustratingly slow. However, the crttical significance of the 
subject for the economic, social and political futJre of the United States 
warrants continued attention and inquiry by some of this country's foremost 
scholars. Forced to make navigating decisions for the economic system, 
public policy makers would benefit from the discovery of a few more "islands 
of knowledge". 
